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Some recent arguments about the incompatibility of poststructuralist theory 
and feminist politics designate rape and the raped woman's body as symbols 
of the real. Mary E. Hawkesworth, in an article entitled "Knowers, Know-
ing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth," defines two tendencies 
of what she calls "postmodern" thought—a conflation of reality and tex-
tuality, and an emphasis on the impossibility of ascertaining the meaning of 
texts. Toward the end of her essay she states: 
The undesirable consequences of the slide into relativism that results from 
too facile a conflation of world and text is particularly evident when fem-
inist concerns are taken as a starting point. Rape, domestic violence, and 
sexual harassment . . . are not fictions or figurations that admit of the 
free play of signification. The victim's account of these experiences is not 
simply an arbitrary imposition of a purely fictive meaning on an otherwise 
meaningless reality. A victim's knowledge of the event may not be ex-
haustive; . . . But it would be premature to conclude from the incom-
pleteness of the victim's account that all other accounts (the assailant's, 
defense attorney's, character witnesses' for the defendant) are equally valid 
or that there are no objective grounds on which to distinguish between 
truth and falsity in divergent interpretations.1 
Hawkesworth makes three claims: that rape is real; that to be real means 
to be fixed, determinate, and transparent to understanding; and that feminist 
politics must understand rape as one of the real, clear facts of women's lives. 
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As her argument unfolds it contradicts each of these claims. The subject of 
the second quoted sentence is "rape"; the subject of the third quoted sentence 
is "the victim's account of these experiences." This substitution of account 
for event implies the very inseparability of text and world which Hawkes-
worth had previously criticized in postmodern thought, and indeed leads her 
to reverse her characterization of postmodernism: where earlier in the piece 
postmodernism conflated the fictive and the real, here it problematically sep-
arates them because it considers a woman's account of rape "an arbitrary 
imposition of a purely fictive meaning on an otherwise meaningless reality." 
The subject of the paragraph shifts again in the fourth quoted sentence, this 
time to the rape trial, which Hawkesworth insists will adjudicate among 
competing accounts of the rape; she ends the paragraph with a barrage of 
legalistic terms—"the standards of evidence, criteria of relevance, para-
digms of explanation and norms of truth" which, she holds, one can and 
must use to determine the truth value of rape accounts. Such a conclusion 
in fact jettisons feminism's selective political focus on the raped woman, 
since "standards of evidence" and "norms of truth" derive their prestige 
from their claims to apply equally to all men and women, all points of view, 
and all situations. Hawkesworth's argument that the reality of rape must be 
the "starting point" of feminist politics thus leads her to espouse a suppos-
edly apolitical system of objective judgment. Her climactic assertion that 
"there are some things that can be known" could be the summing-up of a 
rapist's defense as easily as that of his prosecution. 
Hawkesworth intends to distinguish this empiricist, epistemological view 
of rape from the textual, postmodern view. Where she insists on rape's real-
ity, she sees postmodernism insisting on rape's indeterminacy as an event, 
and hence on the impossibility of ascribing blame to a rapist and innocence 
to a victim. 2 Where she turns to the legal determination of blame, Michel 
Foucault, a theorist whom she associates with postmodernism, cautions against 
repressive measures which might stigmatize male sexuality and advocates 
instead making economic reparation to raped women. 3 Yet ultimately Haw-
kesworth adopts the same perspective on rape that her postmodern opponents 
do: in the eyes of all these thinkers, rape has always already occurred and 
women are always either already raped or already rapable. Hawkesworth 
believes that women can derive power from proving that they have been 
made powerless and from identifying the perpetrators of this victimization. 
Postmodernists take issue with the notions of law, action, knowledge, and 
identity which would enable a woman to label a man her rapist. But for both 
parties, when they think about rape, they inevitably see a raped woman. 
Hawkesworth does not address this fundamental fit between her view 
of rape and the postmodern one; nor does she rebut the specific content of 
postmodern analyses of rape. Rather, she asserts the incompatibility of post-
modern theories of language and reality with feminist political action against 
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rape. This assertion actually contradicts one of feminism's most powerful 
contentions about rape—that rape is a question of language, interpretation, 
and subjectivity. Feminist thinkers have asked: Whose words count in a rape 
and a rape trial? Whose "no" can never mean "no"? How do rape trials 
condone men's misinterpretations of women's words? How do rape trials 
consolidate men's subjective accounts into objective "norms of truth" and 
deprive women's subjective accounts of cognitive value? 4 Feminists have 
also insisted on the importance of naming rape as violence and of collec-
tively narrating stories of rape. 5 Though some of these theorists might ex-
plicitly assert that rape is real, their emphasis on recounting rape suggests 
that in their view actions and experiences cannot be said to exist in politically 
real and useful ways until they are perceptible and representable. A feminist 
politics which would fight rape cannot exist without developing a language 
about rape, nor, I will argue, without understanding rape to be a language. 
What founds these languages are neither real nor objective criteria, but po-
litical decisions to exclude certain interpretations and perspectives and to 
privilege others. 
In this essay I propose that we understand rape as a language and use 
this insight to imagine women as neither already raped nor inherently rap-
able. I will argue against the political efficacy of seeing rape as the fixed 
reality of women's lives, against an identity politics which defines women 
by our violability, and for a shift of scene from rape and its aftermath to 
rape situations themselves and to rape prevention. Many current theories of 
rape present rape as an inevitable material fact of life and assume that a 
rapist's ability to physically overcome his target is the foundation of rape. 
Susan Brownmiller represents this view when she states in her influential 
1975 book, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, that "in terms of 
human anatomy the possibility of forcible intercourse incontrovertibly ex-
ists. This single factor may have been sufficient to have caused the creation 
of a male ideology of rape. When men discovered that they could rape, they 
proceeded to do i t ." 6 Such a view takes violence as a self-explanatory first 
cause and endows it with an invulnerable and terrifying facticity which stym-
ies our ability to challenge and demystify rape. To treat rape simply as one 
of what Hawkesworth calls "the realities that circumscribe women's lives" 
can mean to consider rape as terrifyingly unnameable and unrepresentable, 
a reality that lies beyond our grasp and which we can only experience as 
grasping and encircling us. 7 In its efforts to convey the horror and iniquity 
of rape, such a view often concurs with masculinist culture in its designation 
of rape as a fate worse than, or tantamount to, death; the apocalyptic tone 
which it adopts and the metaphysical status which it assigns to rape implies 
that rape can only be feared or legally repaired, not fought. 
Feminist antirape literature, activism, and policy development on rape 
in the United States during the last two decades have increasingly concen-
388 / Sharon Marcus 
trated on police procedures and legal definitions of rape. This focus can 
produce a sense of futility: rape itself seems to be taken for granted as an 
occurrence and only postrape events offer possible occasions for interven_ 
tion. Although feminist drives to change the legal definition of rape, to in-
crease the penalties for rape and to render the terms of a rape trial less 
prejudicial to the raped woman have publicized rape's seriousness as a crime, 
an almost exclusive insistence on equitable reparation and vindication in the 
courts has limited effectiveness for a politics of rape prevention. Quite lit-
erally, the rape has already occurred by the time a case comes to court; a 
verdict of guilty can in no way avert the rape itself, and no one has proven 
a direct link between increased penalties and convictions for a crime and a 
decreased incidence of that crime. The notorious racism and sexism of the 
United States police and legal systems often compromise the feminist goals 
of a rape trial. Interracial rape cases constitute a minority of rapes committed 
and rapes brought to trial, but when the rapist is white, exhibit Significantly 
lower rates of conviction than intraracial rape cases, and much higher rates 
of conviction when the rapist is Afro-American. In both intra- and interracial 
rape trials, raped Afra-Americans often do not obtain convictions even in 
the face of overwhelming evidence of brutalization; mped white women have 
great difficulty in obtaining convictions against white rapists. In the rela-
tively smaller percentage of cases where they have been raped by Afro-
Americans, white women often obtain legal victories at the cost of juries' 
giving currency to racist prejudices and to patronizing ideologies of female 
protection. These biases fabricate and scapegoat a rapist of color and im-
plicitly condone the exploitation and rape of women of color. 8 Finally, court-
room trials assert first and foremost their own legitimacy and power to judge 
events, and only grant power to the vindicated party on the condition that 
the court's power be acknowledged. 
Attempts to stop rape through legal deterrence fundamentally choose to 
persuade men not to rape .. They thus assume that men simply have the power 
to rape and concede this primary power to them, implying that at best men 
can secondarily be dissuaded from using this power by means of threatened 
punishment from a masculinized state or legal system. They do not envision 
strategies which will enable women to sabotage men's power to rape, which 
will empower women to take the ability to rape completely out of men's 
hands. 
We can avoid these self-defeating pitfalls by regarding rape not as a 
fact to be accepted or opposed, tried or avenged, but as a process to be 
analyzed and undermined as it occurs. One way to achieve this is to focus 
on what actually happens during rape attempts and on differentiating as much 
as possible among various rape situations in order to develop the fullest 
range of rape prevention strategies.'} Another way to refuse to recognize rape 
as the real fact of our lives is to treat it as a linguistic fact: to ask how the 
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violence of rape is enabled by narratives, complexes and institutions which 
derive their strength not from outright, immutable, unbeatable force but rather 
from their power to structure our lives as imposing cultural scripts. To un-
derstand rape in this way is to understand it as subject to change. 
The definition of rape as a linguistic fact can be taken several ways. 
One common conjunction of rape and language refers to the many images 
of rape which our culture churns out, representations which often transmit 
the ideological assumptions and contradictions of rape-women are rapable, 
women deserve rape/women provoke rape, women want rape, women are 
ashamed of being raped/women publicly lie about being raped. While these 
cultural productions can collude in and perpetuate rape in definite and com-
plicated ways, the statement that rape is a linguistic fact should not be taken 
to mean that such linguistic forms actually rape women. 
Another crucial, literal way to understand rape as a linguistic fact is to 
highlight the presence of speech in rape. Contrary to received wisdom, which 
imagines rape as a wordless, absolutely impersonal attack, most rapists take 
verbal initiatives with their targets in addition to deploying physical aggres-
sion. Many rapists initially engage their targets in friendly or threatening 
conversation; many speak a great deal during the rape and demand that the 
women whom they rape either talk to them or recite particular phrases. In-
ternalized strictures on what can be spoken and on what is unspeakable-
which restrict men and women differently-structure rape situations as much 
as physical inequalities do, particularly when a woman knows a rapist-the 
most prevalent rape situation. 10 Women's noncombative responses to rapists 
often derive as much from the self-defeating rules which govern polite, em-
pathetic feminine conversation as they do from explicit physical fear. 11 To 
prevent rape. women must resist self-defeating notions of polite feminine 
speech as well as develop physical self-defense tactics. 
A "continuum" theory of sexual violence links language and rape in a 
way that can be taken to mean that representations of rape, obscene remarks, 
threats and other forms of harassment should be considered equivalent to 
rape. Such a definition substitutes the remarks and threats which gesture 
toward a rape for the rape itself, and thus contradicts the very meaning of 
"continuum," which requires a temporal and logical distinction between the 
various stages of a rape attempt. In a "continuum" theory which makes one 
type of action, a verbal threat, immediately substitutable for another type 
of action, sexual assault, the time and space between these two actions col-
lapse and once again, rape has always already occurred. Such verbal acts 
should be countered and censured for what they are-initiatives to set up a 
rape situation. To make them metaphors for rape itself, however, occludes 
the gap between the threat and the rape-the gap in which women can try 
to intervene, overpower and deflect the threatened action. 12 
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Yet another way to analyze rape as a linguistic fact argues that rape is 
structured like a language, a language which shapes both the verbal and 
physical interactions of a woman and her would-be assailant. To say that 
rape is structured like a language can account both for rape's prevalence and 
its potential prevention. Language is a social structure of meanings which 
enables people to experience themselves as speaking, acting, and embodied 
subjects. 1 3 We can outline the language of rape in the United States along 
raced and gendered axes. The language of rape seeks to induce in white 
women an exclusive and erroneous fear of nonwhite men as potential rapists 
and legitimizes white men's sexual violence against all women as well as 
their retributive violence against nonwhite men in the name of protecting or 
avenging white women. At various historical moments this language has 
intensively designated Afra-Americans as targets of rape attempts—so much 
so that generations of Afro-Americans have developed definite languages of 
resistance to rape. Simultaneously or at other times, the language of rape 
may also address women of color as generic "women." The language of 
rape solicits women to position ourselves as endangered, violable, and fear-
ful and invites men to position themselves as legitimately violent and entitled 
to women's sexual services. This language structures physical actions and 
responses as well as words, and forms, for example, the would-be rapist's 
feelings of powerfulness and our commonplace sense of paralysis when 
threatened with rape. 
As intractably real as these physical sensations may appear to us, how-
ever, they appear so because the language of rape speaks through us, freez-
ing our own sense of force and affecting the would-be rapist's perceptions 
of our lack of strength. Rapists do not prevail simply because as men they 
are really, biologically, and unavoidably stronger than women. A rapist fol-
lows a social script and enacts conventional, gendered structures of feeling 
and action which seek to draw the rape target into a dialogue which is skewed 
against her. A rapist's ability to accost a woman verbally, to demand her 
attention, and even to attack her physically depends more on how he po-
sitions himself relative to her socially than it does on his allegedly superior 
physical strength. His belief that he has more strength than a woman and 
that he can use it to rape her merits more analysis than the putative fact of 
that strength, because that belief often produces as an effect the male power 
that appears to be rape's cause. 
I am defining rape as a scripted interaction which takes place in lan-
guage and can be understood in terms of conventional masculinity and fem-
ininity as well as other gender inequalities inscribed before an individual 
instance of rape. The word "script" should be taken as a metaphor conveying 
several meanings. To speak of a rape script implies a narrative of rape, a 
series of steps and signals whose typical initial moments we can learn to 
recognize and whose final outcome we can learn to stave off. The concept 
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of a narrative avoids the problems of the collapsed continuum described 
earlier, in which rape becomes the inevitable beginning, middle, and end 
of any interaction. The narrative element of a script leaves room and makes 
time for revision. 1 4 
We are used to thinking of language as a tool which we preexist and 
can manipulate, but both feminist and poststructuralist theories have per-
suasively contended that we only come to exist through our emergence into 
a preexistent language, into a social set of meanings which scripts us but 
does not exhaustively determine our selves. In this sense the term "rape 
script" also suggests that social structures inscribe on men's and women's 
embodied selves and psyches the misogynist inequalities which enable rape 
to occur. These generalized inequalities are not simply prescribed by a to-
talized oppressive language, nor fully inscribed before the rape occurs— 
rape itself is one of the specific techniques which continually scripts these 
inequalities anew. Patriarchy does not exist as a monolithic entity separate 
from human actors and actresses, impervious to any attempts to change it, 
secure in its role as an immovable first cause of misogynist phenomena such 
as rape; rather, patriarchy acquires its consistency as an overarching de-
scriptive concept through the aggregation of microstrategies of oppression 
such as rape. Masculine power and feminine powerlessness neither simply 
precede nor cause rape; rather, rape is one of culture's many modes of fem-
inizing women. A rapist chooses his target because he recognizes her to be 
a woman, but a rapist also strives to imprint the gender identity of "feminine 
victim" on his target. A rape act thus imposes as well as presupposes mis-
ogynist inequalities; rape is not only scripted—it also scripts. 1 5 
To take male violence or female vulnerability as the first and last in-
stances in any explanation of rape is to make the identities of rapist and 
raped preexist the rape itself. If we eschew this view and consider rape as 
a scripted interaction in which one person auditions for the role of rapist 
and strives to maneuver another person into the role of victim, we can see 
rape as a process of sexist gendering which we can attempt to disrupt. Con-
trary to the principles of criminology and victimology, all rapists do not 
share fixed characteristics, nor do they attack people who are clearly marked 
as rape victims. Rape does not happen to preconstituted victims; it momen-
tarily makes victims. The rapist does not simply have the power to rape; 
the social script and the extent to which that script succeeds in soliciting its 
target's participation help to create the rapist's power. The rape script pre-
exists instances of rape but neither the script nor the rape act results from 
or creates immutable identities of rapist and raped. 
The script should be understood as a framework, a grid of comprehen-
sibility which we might feel impelled to use as a way of organizing and 
interpreting events and actions. We may be swayed by it even against our 
own interests—few women can resist utterly all the current modes of fem-
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inization—but its legitimacy is never complete, never assured. Each act can 
perform the rape script's legitimacy or explode it. By defining rape as a 
scripted performance, we enable a gap between script and actress which can 
allow us to rewrite the script, perhaps by refusing to take it seriously and 
treating it as a farce, perhaps by resisting the physical passivity which it 
directs us to adopt. Ultimately, we must eradicate this social script. In the 
meantime, we can locally interfere with it by realizing that men elaborate 
masculine power in relation to imagined feminine powerlessness; since we 
are solicited to help create this power, we can act to destroy it. This is not 
to say that women must demonstrate resistance to provide legal proof that 
sexual overtures were undesired. A resistance criterion for defining rape has 
often been used to absolve rapists by expecting women trained in passivity 
to be able to display the same levels of aggressivity as men. 1 6 But clearly 
it is preferable to have stopped a rape attempt ourselves than to have our 
raped selves vindicated in court. We should not be required to resist to prove 
our innocence at some later judicial date, but we should do so to serve our 
own immediate interests. 
Before we can combat the creation of our powerlessness and of the 
rapist's power, we need a more detailed understanding of the underpinnings 
of the rape script. The rape script takes its form from what I will call a 
gendered grammar of violence, where grammar means the rules and struc-
ture which assign people to positions within a script. Between men of dif-
ferent races, this grammar predicates white men as legitimate subjects of 
violence between all men and as subjects of legitimate sexual violence against 
all women; it portrays men of color as ever-threatening subjects of illegit-
imate violence against white men and illegitimate sexual violence against 
white women. In an intraracial context, this grammar generically predicates 
men as legitimate perpetrators of sexual violence against women. I will ad-
dress the difference between violence between men and sexual violence in 
greater detail below, but within the category of general violence we should 
distinguish among "legitimate violence between," "illegitimate violence 
against," and "legitimate violence against." Legitimate violence between 
men signifies a competitive pact between potential equals which permits 
venues for violence; in the United States today, this suggests an intraracial 
configuration of sparring partners. Illegitimate violence against implies that 
the violence is an unjustifiable and unthinkable attack which challenges so-
cial inequalities and can thus legitimately be responded to in unthinkable 
ways such as lynching; dominant U.S. culture tends to label most initiatives 
by men of color against whites as "illegitimate violence against." Intraracial 
male violence against women does not challenge social inequalities and hence 
is commonly thought to be legitimate; women's resistance to this violence 
is considered unthinkable and often condemned when it occurs. The dom-
inant grammar of rape subsumes intraracial sexual violence under the rubric 
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of gender; it does not activate race as a meaningful factor when a man rapes 
a woman of the same race. Nor does the dominant grammar of rape actively 
acknowledge paragrammars of gender which do not foster marking women 
as objects of violence, just as the dominant grammar of language does not 
1 acknowledge paralanguages to be anything more than opaque and ungram-
matical "dialects." 
The gendered grammar of violence predicates men as the objects of 
violence and the operators of its tools, and predicates women as the objects 
of violence and the subjects of fear. This grammar induces men who follow 
the rules set out for them to recognize their gendered selves in images and 
narratives of aggression in which they are agents of violence who either 
initiate violence or respond violently when threatened. A grammatically cor-
rect mirror of gender reflects back to men heroic images in which they risk 
death, brave pain and never suffer violence to be done to them without at-
tempting to pay it back in kind. This mirror reflects back to women images 
which conflate female victimization and female value; this grammar en-
courages women to become subjects by imagining ourselves as objects. 
Feminist theory has widely acknowledged that when women follow so-
cial conventions we recognize and enact our gendered selves as objects of 
violence. It is by now a feminist truism—but nonetheless still an important 
feminist truth—that the criteria of feminine beauty and worthy feminine be-
havior, if enacted without any modification, create a trammeled, passive 
person. Our culture's various techniques of feminization tend to buttress the 
rape script, since the femininity they induce "makes a feminine woman the 
perfect victim of sexual aggression." 1 7 Studies of rape scenarios enable us 
to differentiate at least two grammatical positions appointed to and adopted 
by some women in a rape script, both of which go against women's interest 
in preventing rape. An interpretive stance of empathy, a quality deemed 
feminine even when detached from female practitioners, prods some women 
to identify with rapists rather than to defend themselves from rapists' desire 
to destroy their targets. One author, Frederick Storaska, even advocates em-
pathy as a mode of self-defense, reasoning that men rape to compensate for 
a lack of self-esteem and love; he thus claims that when women respond 
lovingly to potential rapists, they no longer feel compelled to rape. 1 8 Even 
if we accept this dubious premise for heuristic purposes, we still observe 
that it places all human agency on the male side: to avert rape, a woman 
must make a man feel like a full human being, rather than force him to 
recognize her will and humanity. A second, communicative stance of re-
sponsiveness encourages women not to take the offensive in a dialogue with 
a would-be rapist but to stay within the limits he sets—she can consent or 
not consent, acquiesce to his demands or dissuade him from them, but she 
does not actively interrupt him to shift the terms of discussion. 1 9 
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Though feminist theorists of rape have thoroughly analyzed how women 
serve as objects of violence, they have focused less consistently on how 
women become subjects of fear and what effect this subjection has on our 
enactment of rape scripts. (By subjection, I mean a process which does not 
simply oppress, dominate and destroy women but one which incites us to 
become subjects by subjecting us to fear.) Various theories have recognized 
that rape causes fear, but have ignored the other half of the vicious circle 
that often rapes succeed as a result of women's fears. In The Female Fear 
Margaret T. Gordon and Stephanie Riger have argued that the distribution 
of fear corresponds to the other unequal distributions of privilege in U.S. 
society. 2 0 Even though women in fact are neither the sole objects of sexual 
violence nor the most likely targets of violent crimes, women constitute the 
majority of fearful subjects; even in situations where men are empirically 
more likely to suffer from violent crimes, they express less fear than women 
do, and tend to displace this fear onto a concern for their mothers, sisters, 
wives, and daughters which usually takes the form of restricting their mo-
bility by means of warning these women not to go out alone or at night. 2 1 
The grammar of violence assigns women a disadvantageous position in 
the rape script because it identifies us as objects of violence and because it 
offers the insidious inducement of a subject position which assigns us an 
active role vis-ä-vis fear—a role which is all the more insidious for its ap-
parent agency. Whereas masculine fear triggers the notorious "fight-or-flight" 
response, feminine fear inspires the familiar sensations of "freezing"—in-
voluntary immobility and silence. Women learn to recognize ourselves as 
subjects of this fear and thus to identify with a state which does not elaborate 
our subjectivity but dissolves it. This fear may differ from one rape situation 
to another. Acquaintance and marital rapes distort the contract of male pro-
tection of women and shatter the community of care established between 
lovers; they may produce an uncanny, dreadful estrangement from familiar 
expectations. A sudden attack by a stranger may produce shocked, stunned 
terror. At the broadest level, however, the grammar of violence dictates that 
feminine fear concentrate the self on the anticipation of pain, the inefficacy 
of action, and the conviction that the self will be destroyed. Feminine fear 
precipitates all violence and agency outside of its subject; it thus disables 
its subject from risking possible pain or death in order to defend herself, 
since that risk can seem viable only if the subject perceives herself as pos-
sessing some violent capacity on which she can draw to try to survive pain 
or elude injury. Feminine fear also seems to entail a complete identification 
of a vulnerable, sexualized body with the self; we thus come to equate rape 
with death, the obliteration of the self, but see no way we can draw on our 
selves to save that self and stave off rape. 
In terms of rape prevention, this grammar of violence and fear also 
structures what can be called an instrumental theory of rape and determines 
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ideas about feminine self-defense. The instrumental theory of rape, pro-
pounded by Susan Brownmiller in Against Our Will, argues that men rape 
because their penises possess the objective capacity to be weapons, tools, 
and instruments of torture. 2 2 Traditional self-defense advice given to women 
assumes this quasi-invincibility of the male body and advocates passive 
avoidance techniques. This counsel cautions against the use of any type of 
weapon unless the woman can be sure to use it effectively; the implication 
is that unless one is absolutely certain that one's actions will be effective, 
one should not attempt to defend one's self at all. When police manuals do 
mention that one can wield impromptu weapons, they tend to cite flimsy 
and obsolete accessories such as hatpins, rather than suggest that women 
carry more serviceable objects. These same manuals often neglect to men-
tion male genitalia when they designate the vulnerable points of a potential 
rapist's body, thus perpetuating the myth of the unassailably powerful penis. 
These views enact, in effect, a gendered polarization of the grammar of 
violence in which the male body can wield weapons, can make itself into 
a weapon, and benefits from an enforced ignorance concerning its own vul-
nerability; the female body is predicated by this grammar as universally vul-
nerable, lacking force, and incompetent to supplement its deficiencies with 
tools which could vanquish the penis's power by dissimulating it. In a cul-
ture which relentlessly urges women to make up for our lacks by accessor-
izing, we are told that we cannot manage bodily accessories if we manipulate 
them for purposes of self-defense, and that we will be best served by con-
senting to be accessories to our own violation. We are taught the following 
fallacy—that we can best avoid getting hurt by letting someone hurt us. We 
absorb the following paradox—that rape is death, but that in a rape the only 
way to avoid death is to accept it. Consenting to the death of rape forms 
our only possibility of fighting for our lives, but these lives will have been 
destroyed by the rape. Fear forges the link between these contradictory state-
ments: rape is so terrifying because it is like death, and this totalizing fear 
disables us from combating the rape. 
We can begin to develop a feminist discourse on rape by displacing the 
emphasis on what the rape script promotes—male violence against women— 
and putting into place what the rape script stultifies and excludes—women's 
will, agency, and capacity for violence. One of the few books on rape pre-
vention, Pauline Bart's and Patricia H. O'Brien's remarkable Stopping Rape: 
Successful Survival Strategies, has persuasively disproved the widespread 
belief that resistance to rape will lead only to injury because it will anger 
the would-be rapist. The authors deftly point out that "advising women to 
either comply or risk injury assumes that rape itself does not result in in-
jury." They also show that in their sample, there "was no relationship be-
tween the women's use of physical resistance and the rapists' use of addi-
tional force over and above the rape attempt," and that passive responses 
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often led to increased violence on the rapist's part . 2 3 Their surveys of women 
who prevented rape attempts consistently show that resistance does work 
and that often minimal signs of it—an assertive remark, a push, a loud 
scream, flight—can suffice to block a man from continuing a rape attempt 
Many women were able to prevent rape even when the rapist threatened 
them with a gun or knife. We can translate this finding into the terms of 
our grammatical framework by saying that the grammar of violence defines 
rape as an act committed against a subject of fear and not against a subject 
of violence—not, that is, against someone whom the would-be rapist as-
sumes would attempt to fight back. 2 4 This assumption forms such an integral 
part of the rape script that we can say that simply by fighting back, we cease 
to be grammatically correct feminine subjects and thus become much less 
legible as rape targets. 
In order to understand the difference which fighting back can make, 
we must distinguish sexualized violence from subject-subject violence. Sex-
ualized violence anticipates and seeks its target's subjection as a subject of 
fear, defenselessness, and acquiescence to injury. In subject-subject vio-
lence, each interlocutor expects and incites violence in the other, whereas 
in sexualized violence women are excluded from this community of vio-
lence. 2 5 Subject-subject violence underlies intraracial masculine homosocial 
competition, in which men fight one another with the understanding that 
they are following the same rules and that one man can expect to receive 
from another any violence which he metes out to him. Although on one 
level the men are opponents, on another level they cooperate in their agree-
ment to play the same game. 
This gentleman's agreement does not obtain in a rape situation. Bart 
and O'Brien's analysis shows that unassertive, accommodating strategies 
which assume a contract situation of "mutual self-interest and good-will" 
fail to persuade a rapist who in no way identifies with the interests or sub-
jectivity of his target. 2 6 Flight can work more effectively than rational ne-
gotiations since it simply breaks away from a script of polite, empathetic 
response to a potential aggressor. Verbal self-defense can successfully dis-
rupt the rape script by refusing to concede the rapist's power. Treating the 
threat as a joke; chiding the rapist; bargaining to move to a different place, 
to perform only certain acts, or to have the rapist put any weapons he might 
have aside, are all examples of verbal methods which have in some cases 
thwarted rape attempts because they assert a woman's agency, not her 
violability, and a woman's power, rather than her fearful powerlessness. 
A rapist confronted with a wisecracking, scolding, and bossy woman 
may lose his grip on his power to rape; a rapist responded to with fear 
may feel his power consolidated. While we cannot underestimate the 
power of talking back and talking at the rapist, physical retaliation goes even 
further to disrupt the grammer of rape. Directed physical action is as signif-
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icant a criterion of humanity in our culture as words are, and we must de-
velop our capacities for violence in order to disrupt the rape script. Most 
women feel more able to use verbal strategies than physical ones—but it 
is precisely this feeling which indicates that the rape script has colonized 
our minds and bodies, positioning us as vulnerable to rape. Physical 
action poses the greatest challenge to most women as we think about pre-
venting rape—and because it is our greatest point of resistance, it is the 
grammatical dictum we could flout to our greatest advantage. 2 7 The use of 
physical retaliation undermines the powerlessness which the scenario of 
violence and fear scripts for us. By talking back and fighting back we 
place ourselves as subjects who can engage in dialogic violence and re-
spond to aggression in kind; in addition to offering us an opportunity to 
elude or even overpower an assailant, self-defense undermines a would-
be rapist by catapulting him out of his role of omnipotent attacker and sur-
prising him into having to fight someone whom he had marked out as a 
purely acquiescent victim. 
Legislation backs up the objectifying violence of the rape script by not 
defining rape as an assault, which would fall under the rubric of subject-
subject violence against persons, but as a sexual offense. This definition 
separates sexual parts from the person and views them as objects which have 
been violated. I have been arguing that to prevent rape, we must resist a 
would-be rapist's attempt to place us in a sexualized, gendered position of 
passivity and that instead we fend off the rape by positioning ourselves as 
if we were in a fight. For definitional purposes, however, rape is clearly 
neither sex nor simple assault. Rape could best be defined as a sexualized 
and gendered attack which imposes sexual difference along the lines of vi-
olence. Rape engenders a sexualized female body defined as a wound, a 
body excluded from subject-subject violence, from the ability to engage in 
a fair fight. Rapists do not beat women at the game of violence, but aim to 
exclude us from playing it altogether. 
We have seen that subject-subject violence presumes a contractual re-
lation between its participants, who engage with one another as equals who 
agree to disagree. This subject of contractual relations also underwrites the 
subject of property ownership. In capitalist culture one owns property by 
virtue of being free to contract with equals to exchange it. Alienability and 
the power to contract for the transfer of alienable goods form the basis of 
property in things, in others, and in one's self. A masculine capacity to 
alienate the self in a risky encounter which involves a contractual exchange 
of aggression positions men as the subjects of property in themselves. This 
capacity, combined with a sense of entitlement to women-as-property, 
positions men as potential rapists in the rape script. Violation entails 
the invasion and destruction of property; it is the obverse of alienation 
which demarcates the boundaries of a property and maintains its integrity 
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in the face of circulation. Since women are considered to be property and 
thus not to own it, it is not possible to enter into contracts with us and thus 
implausible that we would resist attempts to appropriate us . 2 8 If what 
one owns expresses what one is worth and hence what one merits 
women seem to own only our violation—hence we are often said to "de-
serve" rape. 
Many feminist theorists have focused on how the infliction of violence 
against putative female objects is related to the view that women are also 
considered objects of property. Lorenne Clark and Debra Lewis, in Rape: 
The Price of Coercive Sexuality, have offered a thoughtful analysis of the 
relationships among rape culture, rape laws, and property laws. They show 
that the adherents of rape culture see female sexuality as a property which 
only men can truly own, which women often hoard, which can thus justi-
fiably be wrested from us, and which women themselves merely hold 
in trust for a lawful owner. Rape thus becomes the theft or violation 
of one man's property rights by another. Clark and Lewis advocate trans-
forming rape from a crime against a valuable object to a crime which 
violates a female person's right to contract to exchange her own sexual prop-
erty. They thus seek to reinforce women's property in themselves and 
to guarantee women's "right to the exclusive ownership and control of their 
own bodies." 2 9 
This move criticizes male property in women but sustains a definition 
of female sexuality as violable property. The call for female ownership of 
this property does not displace this injurious definition; it merely erects legal 
impediments to carrying out naturalized violations. While I have argued that 
we can prevent rape by positioning ourselves as subjects of violence and 
objects of fear, to assume property-in-ourselves and that our selves are prop-
erty will only extend, not challenge, the hold which rape scripts have over 
women. The rape script strives to put women in the place of objects; prop-
erty metaphors of rape similarly see female sexuality as a circumscribable 
thing. 3 0 The theft metaphor makes rape mirror a simplified model of cas-
tration: a single sexual organ identifies the self, that organ is conceived of 
as an object that can be taken or lost, and such a loss dissolves the self. 
These castration and theft metaphors reify rape as an irrevocable appropri-
ation of female sexuality. 
The rape script describes female bodies as vulnerable, violable, pe-
netrable, and wounded; metaphors of rape as trespass and invasion retain 
this definition intact. The psychological corollary of this property metaphor 
characterizes female sexuality as inner space, rape as the invasion of this 
inner space, and antirape politics as a means to safeguard this inner space 
from contact with anything external to it. The entire female body comes to 
be symbolized by the vagina, itself conceived of as a delicate, perhaps inev-
itably damaged and pained inner space. 
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Antirape activists have often criticized the false demarcation between 
an inside and outside of rape in terms of geographical space: rape culture 
spawns spatial contradictions by warning women not to go outside because 
of possible rape, but most rapes occur inside women's homes. Denatural-
izing this myth unveils the boundary between inside and outside and indi-
cates the irrelevance of this inside/outside distinction for fighting rape: if 
rape can occur inside, then "inside" is no longer what it is meant to be— 
sheltering, separate and distinct from an unsafe, external realm. Yet anti-
rape theorists often continue to map external and internal spatial divisions 
onto the female body by using invasion as a metaphor for rape. This 
metaphor coheres with the gendered grammar of violence outlined earlier, 
since positions vis-ä-vis violence coincide with spatial coordinates: a sub-
ject of violence acts on an object of violence to define her as the boundary 
between exterior and interior, which he crosses, and as the immobilized space 
through which he moves. 3 1 Precisely because the invasion metaphor coheres 
so strongly with the grammar of sexualized violence, we should question its 
efficacy in helping women fight rape. The need to define rape and to assert 
its existence can distract us from plotting its vanishing point. To combat 
rape, we do not need to insist on the reality of an inside/outside distinction 
between the female body and the world; this distinction may be one of the 
rape script's effects, but if so, it is this distinction we must dissolve in order 
to undo rape. 
Neither all women nor all rape survivors represent rape as an invasion 
of female sexual property. Bart and O'Brien's work has shown that many 
women represent rape as the extraction of a service and define it "as some-
thing done with a penis, not something done to a vagina." 3 2 My previous 
claim that rape scripts gender suggests that we view rape not as the invasion 
of female inner space, but as the forced creation of female sexuality as a 
violated inner space. The horror of rape is not that it steals something from 
us but that it makes us into things to be taken. Thus, to demand rights to 
ourselves as property and to request protection for our vulnerable inner space 
is not enough. We do not need to defend our "real" bodies from invasion 
but to rework this elaboration of our bodies altogether. The most deep-rooted 
upheaval of rape culture would revise the idea of female sexuality as an 
object, as property, and as an inner space. 
Such a revision can and should take multiple directions. One possible 
alternative to figuring female sexuality as a fixed spatial unit is to imagine 
sexuality in terms of time and change. The use of past sexual history in rape 
trials to determine the probability of consent and to invoke claims of right 
based on past consent (used to defend the rape rights of boyfriends and 
husbands), demonstrate that rape culture consistently denies female sexuality 
the ability to change over time. Rather than secure the right to alienate and 
own a spatialized sexuality, antirape politics can claim women's right to a 
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self that could differ from itself over time without then having to surren 
its effective existence as a self. The title of a book on acquaintance 
"I Never Called It Rape," provides an emblem of this conception of fem 
sexuality. This title expresses a nonunified consciousness for which the 
of naming the active desire not to have intercourse does not coincide with 
the nonconsensual sexual act; it insists that this split self can come to power> 
and knowledge over time. The title conceives of female sexuality not as a : 
discrete object whose violation will always be painfully and instantly ap-
parent, but as an intelligible process whose individual instances can be rein-
terpreted and renamed over time. s 
I have argued against understanding rape as the forced entry of a real 
inner space and for considering it as a form of invagination in which rape 
scripts the female body as a wounded inner space. We can elude the limits 
of an empiricist approach by developing a politics of fantasy and represen-
tation. Rape exists because our experience and deployment of our bodies is 
the effect of interpretations, representations, and fantasies which often po-
sition us in ways amenable to the realization of the rape script: as paralyzed, 
as incapable of physical violence, as fearful. New cultural productions and 
reinscriptions of our bodies and our geographies can help us begin to revise 
the grammar of violence and to represent ourselves in militant new ways. 
In the place of a tremulous female body or the female self as an immobilized 
cavity, we can begin to imagine the female body as subject to change, as a 
potential object of fear and agent of violence. Conversely, we do not have 
to imagine the penis as an indestructible weapon which cannot help but rape; 
we can take the temporality of male sexuality into consideration and bear 
in mind the fragility of erections and the vulnerability of male genitalia. 
Stopping Rape reports the words of one woman who had been threatened 
with death unless she cooperated with her rapist: " ' If he's going to kill 
me he'll just have to kill me. I will not let this happen to me. And I grab-
bed him by his penis, I was trying to break it, and he was beating me 
all over the head with his fists, I mean, just as hard as he could. I couldn't 
let go. I was just determined I was going to yank it out of the socket. And 
then he lost his erection . . . pushed me away and grabbed his coat and 
. j, 33 ran. 
I have tried to show that such self-defense is not merely an immediately 
effective and practical strategy; as female violence and as the refusal to ac-
cept the rapist's body as powerfully real and really powerful, this self-de-
fense strikes at the heart of rape culture. Self-defense of course offers no 
final solution: it will not always be sufficient to ward off rape and it should 
certainly not be necessary. While the ethical burden to prevent rape does 
not lie with us but with rapists and a society which upholds them, we will 
be waiting a very long time if we wait for men to decide not to rape. To 
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onstruct a society in which we would know no fear, we may first have to 
fnghten rape culture to death. 
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